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The Rhetoric of <Military Readiness>: 
Public Discourse, Whales and Navy Sonar 
 
Terence Check 
St. John‘s University 
 
Abstract 
 
On November 12, 2008, the Supreme Court decided a significant case involving the use of mid-
frequency active sonar in the waters off the coast of Southern California.  In the decision, Winter 
v. NRDC, the High Court ruled that the Navy‘s need to conduct military training using active 
sonar outweighed the interests of environmentalists, who had contended that sonar results in 
devastating effects on marine mammals.  This paper examines the public and legal discourse 
related to the case, arguing that the Navy invoked an ideograph of <military readiness> that 
valorized military technology and expertise at the expense of the natural environment.  The 
paper then examines the implications of the case and the use of <military readiness> in public 
culture. 
 
 
For years, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) and other 
environmental litigants have challenged the 
United States Navy over its use of sonar in 
military exercises.  In key legal victories at 
the district and appellate levels, 
environmentalists had established ―to a near 
certainty‖ that the use of sonar in military 
training exercises ―will cause irreparable 
harm to the environment‖ (Cooper, 2007, at 
33).  However, when the case reached the 
Supreme Court in 2008, the High Court 
reversed these findings and lifted the ban 
on sonar.  According to the opinion of Chief 
Justice Roberts in the case, Winter v. 
NRDC, ―Of course, military interests do not 
always trump other considerations, and we 
have not held that they do.  In this case, 
however, the proper determination of where 
the public interest lies does not strike us as 
a close question‖ (2008, at 35). 
By virtue of its standing as an 
environmental case heard by the Supreme 
Court, the ruling warrants the scrutiny of 
environmental communication scholars.  
Moreover, the decision in the case has 
grave implications for the well being of 
cetaceans and the roles of public 
participation in environmental decision-
making.  Given that the Court firmly sided 
with the military in this instance, the case 
raises questions about whether appeals to 
the ideograph of <military readiness> will 
trump <environmental protection> when 
military officials assert the two come in 
conflict.  For while the need for <military 
readiness> seems self-evident, rhetorically 
it is a highly contested term that resonates 
culturally with public memories of 
vulnerability and surprise. 
Of course, armed with a different 
perspective than the one <military 
readiness> allows, one might challenge the 
assertion by Roberts of where the public 
interest lies.  In this essay, I argue that 
official military, legal, and political discourse 
on the controversy over military sonar and 
marine mammals have utilized the dominant 
ideograph of <military readiness> to exploit 
public anxiety and vulnerability over 
―surprise‖ attacks.  In doing so, <military 
readiness> has entrenched a technological 
psychosis and valorized the ethos of military 
decision makers through a locus of quantity.  
While focusing on <military readiness> in 
this context as the ―necessary motivations 
or justifications for action performed in the 
name of the public‖ (Condit and Lucaites, 
1993, p. xiii), I examine a wide range of 
rhetorical resources that are implicated in 
the production and perpetuation of these 
ideographic boundaries, including legal 
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decisions, briefs submitted to the Supreme 
Court, oral arguments before the Supreme 
Court, congressional hearings, statements 
by military officials, and naval publications.  
I combine McGee‘s ideographic approach 
with Burke‘s dramatism and Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca‘s notion of loci communes 
to reveal how the full range of rhetorical 
resources complemented the Navy‘s use of 
<military readiness> in this controversy. 
First, I examine the environmental 
dispute at issue in the Winter v. NRDC 
case.  Next, I describe the complicated 
procedural and legal history of the case.  
Then I present a diachronic analysis of the 
<military readiness> ideograph, followed by 
a close textual reading of the legal decisions 
and briefs of the case, as well as public 
statements and justifications made by the 
Navy in this dispute.  Finally, I discuss the 
broader rhetorical implications of the case. 
 
Whales and Sonar: Environmental 
Impacts and Legal Challenges 
Passive sonar involves listening for 
the sounds created by others, while active 
sonar involves the transmission of various 
sounds and the reading of its echoes as a 
way of determining the presence of objects.  
The most common type of sonar in use is 
mid-frequency active (MFA) sonar, with 
most systems operating between 3-10 
kiloHertz (KHz).  MFA sonar is currently 
installed on nearly 200 American vessels 
(Jasney, 2005, p. iv).  The military is also 
developing low-frequency active (LFA) 
sonar, which can detect vessels at greater 
distances.  The Navy insists that both types 
of sonar are necessary to detect the new 
generation of diesel-electric submarines, 
which can operate without making noise 
and are virtually undetectable using passive 
sonar systems.  
However, active sonar systems also 
transmit sound at frequencies perceptible to 
marine mammals and can ―physically 
damage the hearing in cetaceans or cause 
them to modify their behavior in ways that 
are detrimental to their well-being‖ (Buck 
and Calvert, 2008, p. 2).  MFA sonar 
―generates piercing underwater sound at 
extreme pressure levels,‖ causing 
―devastating‖ effects to mammals in close 
proximity to the sonar source (Brief for the 
Respondents, 2008, p. 3).  Sound waves 
have the potential to vibrate inside the head 
of a marine mammal, causing massive 
internal injuries.  According to the Navy, an 
analysis of whales stranded in the Bahamas 
in 2000 showed three with signs of bleeding 
in their inner ears and one whale with signs 
of bleeding around the brain.  It ―basically 
rips them apart,‖ remarked Cetacean 
Society International president Bill Rossiter, 
describing the effects of resonance on 
marine mammals (Dooley n.d.).  In addition 
to these effects, scientists have discovered 
emboli in the lungs and lesions in the liver 
and kidneys of stranded whales, all 
symptoms of a severe case of 
decompression sickness—‗the bends‖—
which occurs when animals try to surface 
too quickly (Reynolds, 2008, p. 762).  When 
exposed to sonar, marine mammals can 
experience a wide range of severe physical 
traumas causing ―nervous and 
cardiovascular system dysfunction, 
respiratory distress, disorientation, and 
death‖ (Brief for the Respondents, 2008, p. 
4). 
Mass strandings of marine mammals 
have coincided with military use of active 
sonar systems in a number of locations.  In 
1996, twelve Cuvier‘s beaked whales were 
stranded in Greece.  In 2000, 17 marine 
mammals were stranded in the Bahamas 
shortly after the Navy began exercises 
using MFA sonar.  A subsequent study by 
the Navy and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service concluded that the sonar exercises 
contributed to the strandings (Joint Interim 
Report 2001).  Other strandings have been 
documented in the Canary Islands, the 
Virgin Islands, Washington State, Hawaii, 
and North Carolina, all coinciding with 
military activities (Reynolds 2008). 
There is also evidence that once 
exposed to sonar, marine mammals will 
alter their migratory habits.  After Naval 
sonar exercises in the Bahamas in 2000, a 
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group of Cuvier‘s beaked whales that 
biologists had recorded for years had 
virtually disappeared, leading scientists to 
surmise that the mammals died or ―were 
driven to permanently abandon their habitat‖ 
(Jasney, 2005, p. 11).  Other effects of MFA 
sonar on marine mammals include adverse 
effects on the animals‘ ability to 
communicate, breed, and avoid predators.  
Environmentalists believe that the ―ripple 
effects‖ of these impacts could seriously 
damage marine ecosystems (Brief for the 
Ecological Society 2008). 
Several studies have confirmed the 
consequences of sonar on marine 
mammals.  In its 2004 Report of the 
Scientific Committee, the International 
Whaling Commission concluded that the 
association between sonar and beaked 
whale deaths ―is very convincing and 
appears overwhelming‖ (quoted in Jasney, 
2005, pp. 6-7).  In addition, the Navy‘s own 
Office of Naval Research has concluded 
that the evidence linking whale beaching to 
sonar is ―completely convincing and there is 
serious issue of how best to avoid/minimize 
future beaching events‖ (quoted in Brief of 
California Coastal Commission, 2008, p. 30) 
Although the U.S. military has 
resisted efforts to stem the use of active 
sonar systems, the international community 
has called for the curtailment of sonar.  In 
October 2004, the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution calling on its members 
to stop using high-intensity active sonar 
systems (Dycus, 2005, p. 32).  The United 
Nations also expressed concern about the 
effects of ocean noise on marine mammals.  
At a U.N. meeting in 2005, a coalition of 
more than 120 environmental organizations 
urged nations to take actions to protect 
marine mammals from unregulated ocean 
noise (Buck and Calvert, 2008, p. 12). 
In the United States, the statutory 
mechanism that protects cetaceans is the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 
which prohibits anyone from ―taking‖3 a 
                                                     
3
 As defined by federal law, a “take” means “to 
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, 
marine mammal.  However, the Secretary of 
Defense may ―exempt any action or 
category of actions‖ from the MMPA if they 
are ―necessary for national defense‖ 
(Roberts, 2008, at 15).  Tensions between 
the Navy and environmentalists over the 
use of sonar had emerged in previous 
disputes, resulting in a 2006 settlement that 
allowed training exercises to continue, so 
long as the Navy implemented ―mitigation 
measures‖ designed to minimize the effects 
of MFA sonar on marine mammals.  These 
measures included lookouts on deck to 
search for whales prior to the start of 
training exercises, and reduced decibel 
levels when sailors spotted whales or when 
inclement weather prevented the sighting of 
whales (Mongeon, 2008, p. 277). 
Despite the settlement agreement, in 
early 2007 the Navy planned fourteen large-
scale training exercises off the coast of 
Southern California (known as the ―SOCAL 
exercises‖) in the two-year period from 
February 2007 to January 2009.  The 
waters off the coast of Southern California 
―are among the richest and most biologically 
diverse in the world,‖ containing at least 37 
species of marine mammals, including nine 
of those species listed as threatened or 
endangered under the Endangered Species 
Act and others whose entire known range is 
along this coastline (Brief for the 
Respondents, 2008, p. 3).  Nevertheless, in 
January 2007, the Navy was granted an 
exemption from the MMPA for these training 
exercises, and in February 2007, the Navy 
completed an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) of the planned SOCAL exercises, 
which predicted approximately 170,000 
―takes‖ of marine mammals, an 
―extraordinary number relative to the size of 
cetacean populations off Southern 
California‖ (Brief for Respondents, 2008, p. 
5).  Despite the findings of its own 
assessment, the Navy reasoned that the 
environmental impact of the SOCAL 
exercises would be minimal, and declined to 
                                                                               
hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammal.” 16 U.S.C. 
1362(13). 
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prepare an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS).  In addition, the Navy did not commit 
to using any of the mitigation measures it 
had agreed to in the earlier settlement 
(Mongeon, 2008, p. 278). 
In response to the Navy‘s decision, 
NRDC and five other environmental 
plaintiffs4 filed suit against the Navy on 
March 22, 2007, seeking injunctive relief for 
violations of the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA), the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  On 
June 22, 2007, NRDC filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction against the Navy, 
arguing that either the military had to stop 
using MFA sonar in the SOCAL waters, or 
put in place the mitigation measures 
designed to protect marine mammals.  On 
August 6, 2007, the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California 
granted a preliminary injunction against the 
Navy‘s use of sonar5.  In granting NRDC‘s 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
district court found, among other things, that 
NRDC had demonstrated probable success 
on the merits of its claim that the Navy 
violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS 
prior to the exercises.  The Navy quickly 
filed an emergency motion to stay the 
injunction, which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted on 
August 31, 2007, pending an expedited 
appeal.6  Stating that the ―safety of the 
whales must be weighed, and so must the 
safety of our warriors.  And of the country,‖ 
the appellate court criticized the district 
court for not weighing more explicitly the 
national security interests of the public, and 
it also suggested that the preliminary 
injunction could have been more narrowly 
                                                     
4
 The other plaintiffs in the case were the Fund for Animal 
Welfare, the Cetacean Society International, the League for 
Coastal Protection, the Ocean Futures Society, and Jean-
Michel Cousteau.  For simplicity, I refer to the case by the 
lead plaintiff, the NRDC. 
5
 NRDC v. Winter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57909, at 33. 
6
 NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859. 
tailored to allow for the resumption of 
military exercises with mitigation measures.7 
On November 13, 2007, the 
appellate court vacated the stay and 
remanded the case back to the district court 
so that it could have an opportunity to 
modify the injunction to include appropriate 
mitigation measures.8  Members of the 
District Court then read reply briefs 
submitted by the parties after the remand 
order, and even toured the USS Milius at 
the naval base in San Diego to enhance 
their understanding of the Navy‘s sonar 
training procedures.  Hearing the case 
again on January 3, 2008, district court 
Judge Florence-Marie Cooper ordered the 
Navy to adopt stricter safeguards to protect 
marine mammals.  These mitigation 
measures included a twelve nautical mile 
exclusion zone from the California coastline, 
a shutdown of MFA sonar when a marine 
mammal ventured within 2200 yards of the 
source of the emission, pre-exercise 
monitoring for marine mammals for 60 
minutes prior to using MFA sonar as well as 
monitoring during the exercises, a power 
down when surface ducting conditions 
(occurring when temperature differences in 
adjacent layers of water causes sound to 
travel at greater distances) are detected, the 
prohibition of sonar use in the Catalina 
Basin, and other measures.9  The Navy 
then filed an emergency motion to stay the 
preliminary injunction, which the district 
court denied on January 14, 2008.10   
Seeking to circumvent the court‘s 
order, the Navy made its case before the 
executive Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), presenting it with a ―one-sided 
portion of the district court record, 
containing only the Navy‘s evidence and 
arguments‖ and without the presence of 
NRDC attorneys (Brief for the Respondents, 
2008, p. 11).  Citing the Navy‘s assertion of 
―emergency circumstances,‖ the CEQ 
approved ―alternative arrangements‖ on 
                                                     
7
 NRDC v. Winter, 502 F.3d 859, at 864. 
8
 NRDC v. Winter, 508 F.3d 885. 
9
 NRDC v. Winter, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110. 
10
 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216. 
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January 15, 2008, permitting the Navy to 
continue its exercises while it completed its 
EIS.  On the same day, President George 
W. Bush signed an executive order that 
exempted the Navy from the provisions of 
the CZMA regulating its use of MFA sonar 
in the SOCAL exercises.  In light of those 
developments, the appellate court 
remanded the case again to the district 
court on January 16, 2008, to determine 
what effect the executive actions had on the 
original preliminary injunction.  On February 
4, 2008, the district court left the injunction 
in place, noting that CEQ‘s approval of 
―alternative arrangements‖ was invalid 
because the Navy‘s ―emergency‖ was a 
―creature of its own making,‖ given that the 
military had planned the routine exercises 
well in advance and should have produced 
―adequate environmental documentation in 
a timely fashion, via the traditional EIS 
process or otherwise.‖11  The Navy filed a 
notice of appeal two days later, this time 
taking issue with just two of the six 
mitigation measures imposed by the district 
court—the 2200-yard shutdown and the 
power-down during surface ducting 
conditions. 
On February 27, 2008, the appellate 
court affirmed the district court‘s decision 
and left the injunction in place, arguing that 
it was narrowly-tailored to balance the 
public interests in the natural environment 
and a well-trained Navy.  Still,  ―acting out of 
an abundance of caution,‖ the Ninth Circuit 
court modified the injunction so that the 
Navy need only reduce, not suspend, its 
use of sonar in the 2200-yard zone if marine 
mammals are detected at a ―critical point in 
the exercise,‖ and power-down during 
surface-ducting conditions only when 
observers detect a marine mammal within a 
specified distance of the source of the 
sonar.12 
Unsatisfied with this legal result, the 
Navy appealed the case, and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on June 23, 2008, 
                                                     
11
 NRDC v. Winter, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216, at 30. 
12
 NRDC v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658. 
and heard oral arguments on October 8, 
2008.  On November 12, 2008, the high 
court announced a ruling in the case, 
coming down ―solidly on the side of national 
security‖ by reversing the judgment of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
and lifting the judicial restrictions on the use 
of MFA sonar in submarine training 
exercises off the coast of Southern 
California (Liptak, 2008, p. A24).13 
 
<National Security> and <Military 
Readiness> as Ideographs 
Ideographs, writes Michael Calvin 
McGee, are ―one-term sums of an 
orientation‖ that ―exist in real discourse, 
functioning clearly and evidently as agents 
of political consciousness‖ (1980, p. 7).  
They are ―historically and culturally 
grounded commonplace rhetorical terms 
that sum up and invoke identification with 
key social commitments‖ (Cloud, 2004, p. 
288).  An analysis of ideographs involves an 
account of the ways that rhetors ―dip into, 
add to, and reshape the shared cultural 
stock‖ generated by these widely used and 
near-universal terms and phrases (Cloud, 
1998, p. 389). 
McGee suggests that critics analyze 
both the diachronic and synchronic aspects 
of ideographs (McGee 1980).  The 
diachronic structure of an ideograph 
―represents the full range and history of its 
usages for a particular rhetorical culture‖ 
(Condit and Lucaites, 1993, p. xiii).  It calls 
for an identification of those situations 
where the ideograph is invoked and a 
description of the salient features of its use 
in those circumstances.  A synchronic 
analysis of ideographs examines how 
rhetors make use of them presently, 
especially when they complete with 
opposing ideographs, in a situation where 
the hallowed term constantly reorganizes 
itself ―to accommodate specific 
circumstances while maintaining its 
fundamental consonance and unity‖ 
(McGee, 1980, p. 14).  Rhetors engage in 
                                                     
13
 Winter v. NRDC, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249. 
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struggles to define the boundaries of any 
given ideograph, but they are often 
constrained by the dominant understanding 
of the ideograph in a public culture.  Celeste 
Michelle Condit argues that a rhetorical 
critic develops an understanding of 
persuasive discourse by examining the 
interaction and development of ideographs 
with narratives and characterizations (1987, 
pp. 3-4).  The stories that a culture tells and 
the depictions it provides of particular 
agents, acts, scenes, purposes, and 
agencies helps to generate a dominant 
world view around a given set of 
ideographs.   
A full accounting of the diachronic 
origin of <military readiness> is beyond the 
scope of this essay.  However, appeals to 
<military readiness> have been invoked at 
strategic times throughout American history.  
It is widely perceived that the ―ability to be 
ready to fight or conduct military operations 
successfully‖ is one of the most important 
purposes of the military (Laird, 1980, p. 1).  
George Washington, in his first Annual 
Address to Congress, declared, ―To be 
prepared for war is one of the most effectual 
means of preserving peace.‖  With respect 
to maritime readiness in particular, 
Theodore Roosevelt observed, ―the only 
way in which a navy can ever be made 
efficient is by practice at sea, under all the 
conditions which would have to be met if 
war existed‖ (Brief for the Petitioners, 2008, 
p. 48).  And while Chief Justice Roberts 
cited both of these statements in his opinion 
in Winter, McGee (1980) urges critics to 
look for touchstones that serve as cultural 
precedents for ideographs.  In particular, 
iconic events are those seminal moments 
―which seem to acquire a mythic status 
within the culture‖ (Leavy, 2007, p. 3) and 
generate opportunities for ideographic 
construction and refinement.  In the context 
of American <military readiness>, one 
moment stands out as iconic: the December 
7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor.14  While 
                                                     
14
 An extended version of this essay includes a diachronic 
analysis of the uses of <military readiness> after the 
implied throughout much of the discourse in 
Winter over enemy use of diesel-electric 
submarines, Roberts made explicit 
reference to the Pearl Harbor analogy in 
oral arguments before the Court on October 
8, 2008.  At ―no point,‖ complained the Chief 
Justice, ―did the district judge undertake a 
balancing of the equities, putting on the one 
side the potential for harm to marine 
mammals…and putting on the other side 
the potential that a North Korean diesel 
electric submarine will get within range of 
Pearl Harbor undetected.  Now, I think that‘s 
a pretty clear balance‖ (Oral Arguments, 
2008, p. 48). 
As Michael Slackman observes, 
―There is little argument…that the Pearl 
Harbor attack was a dramatic event which in 
the space of a few hours plunged the United 
States into the most destructive war of the 
twentieth century and changed forever the 
way most Americans viewed the world 
around them‖ (1990, p. vii).  Although 
research has confirmed that American 
officials had numerous warnings that a 
Japanese attack was pending (Wohlstetter 
1962; Posner 2005: Wirtz 2006), Pearl 
Harbor has achieved mythic status in 
American culture as a moment when 
America was caught by surprise.  ―In the 
popular view,‖ writes Richard K. Betts, ―the 
Japanese attack on Hawaii was a true ‗bolt 
out of the blue,‘ without warning, and a pure 
example of unprovoked perfidy‖ (1982, p. 
42). 
One of the many cultural ―lessons‖ 
that some derived from the Pearl Harbor 
attack was the need for constant vigilance 
against the strategic vulnerability that 
comes with complacency.  Although 
competing narratives of the attack have 
circulated for decades, the dominant public 
memory of the event falls within the ―infamy 
framework‖ that harkens back to rhetorical 
                                                                               
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon, especially considering the comparisons that 
public officials have made between Pearl Harbor and 9/11.  
Both events resonate as examples of the lack of military 
preparedness, but Pearl Harbor is more relevant to the 
public justification of MFA sonar, given that it relies upon 
fears of enemy utilization of advanced military technologies. 
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traditions of the American frontier 
(Rosenberg 2003, pp. 12-13).  According to 
this tradition, diabolical forces will exploit 
weak, feminized, and complacent publics, 
but salvation for the Nation is available 
through retributive, masculine uses of 
military power. 
The <military readiness> ideograph 
thrives in this rhetorical context because it 
offers an antidote to the perceived 
vulnerability of surprise attacks.  Pearl 
Harbor serves as an iconic touchstone, ―a 
singular moment in modern American 
history‖ when ―penetration of our borders by 
a hostile force…had the effect on the 
country that a burglary has on the family 
home: people never felt quite as safe again‖ 
(Jennings and Brewster, 1998, p. 239).  
Pearl Harbor is constructed in public 
memory as a cautionary tale, and combined 
with <military readiness> it serves as a 
narrative reminding citizens to stay vigilant 
against surprise attacks, to utilize superior 
American technology to uncover and thwart 
potential surprises, and to heed the 
warnings of military officials while rejecting 
policies that might impede military 
preparedness (especially when they are 
promoted by those who are ignorant of 
strategic dangers).  This rhetoric functions 
to ―persuade us of war‘s necessity, but then 
[we] forget that it is a rhetoric‖ (McGee, 
1980, p. 6). 
 
Analysis  
Even before NRDC had initiated the 
legal action that led to the Supreme Court 
decision in Winter v. NRDC, the military had 
rehearsed <readiness> in other 
environmental contexts by affixing the 
rhetorical label of ―encroachment‖ on any 
regulation that allegedly hindered military 
preparedness.  Speaking during 
congressional hearings in 2001, Army Lt. 
Gen. Larry Ellis testified, ―readiness is 
critical to our ability to perform the missions 
assigned to us and to do so efficiently and 
with minimum casualties‖ (quoted in 
Bethurem, 2002, p. 122). 
When NRDC and the other 
environmental plaintiffs challenged the use 
of MFA sonar in training exercises off the 
coast of Southern California, the military 
utilized <military readiness> in a variety of 
legal and public contexts.  In a statement 
before the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee on April 2, 2003, Rear 
Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, the deputy 
commander of the Navy‘s Pacific fleet, 
warned of ―new ultra quiet diesel-electric 
submarines armed with deadly torpedoes 
and cruise missiles‖ that could only be 
detected by sailors who could ―train 
realistically with the latest technology, 
including next-generation passive and 
active sonars‖ (pp. 244-45).  Claiming, 
―military readiness requirements and 
environmental protection are out of 
balance,‖ Greenert urged lawmakers to 
support the Navy‘s perspective.  In a 
declaration on ―The Impact of 
Environmental Extremism on Military 
Readiness,‖ the Senate Republican Policy 
Committee railed against 
―burdensome…environmental laws and 
lawsuits which prevent the military from fully 
achieving readiness,‖ and singled out 
lawsuits that prevented the Navy from using 
―sonar to track the newer, ultra-quiet 
submarines operated by China, North 
Korea, and Iran‖ (U.S. Senate Republican 
Policy Committee, 2003, p. 1).  According to 
the Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter 
in his 2008 Posture Statement, ―the most 
critical readiness issue relates to the Navy‘s 
ability to train using active sonar…The 
inability to train effectively with active sonar 
literally puts the lives of thousands of 
Americans at risk‖ (p. 11). 
Kenneth Burke (1984) has identified 
the technological psychosis as the 
prevailing orientation of modern society.  
While Burke examined a range of 
psychoses, the technological perspective 
emerged as dominant: ―in and about all 
these, above them, beneath them, mainly 
responsible for their perplexities, is the 
technological psychosis,‖ the drive ―to 
control for our purposes the forces of 
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technology, or machinery‖ (p. 44).  Floyd D. 
Anderson and Lawrence J. Prelli (2001) 
explain that such an orientation typically 
features a pentadic ratio of agency-purpose 
or agency-scene as dominant: ―Indeed, the 
central motivation locked within 
technological discourse is agency-purpose; 
its strict instrumentalism not only transforms 
acts, agents, and scenes into terms of 
agency, but even purposes themselves 
become meaningful only when nearly 
synonymous with agency‖ (p. 80).  
Subordinated in this vocabulary of motives 
are perspectives that feature agent, act, or 
scene. 
In the Winter case, the Navy‘s 
appeal of the preliminary injunction centered 
on its objection to two of the mitigation 
measures imposed by the district court: the 
2200-yard shutdown requirement and the 
power-down requirement during surface 
ducting conditions.  These requirements 
were hardly onerous, given the Navy‘s 
experience conducting exercises with 
restrictions similar to the ones mandated by 
the district court.  For example, the 
settlement between the Navy and NRDC 
that the parties reached shortly before the 
Navy‘s ―Rim of the Pacific‖ exercise off the 
coast of Hawaii in 2006 had similar 
stipulations (Fletcher, 2008, at 35-40).  
Following these exercises, the Navy issued 
an ―after action report‖ that recorded a total 
of 472 hours of MFA sonar use with only 
eight hours of lost time due to the mitigation 
measures.  Furthermore, NRDC presented 
evidence that the effect of widening the 
safety zone to 2200 yards would have been 
only one additional shutdown or power 
down for each exercise (Oral Arguments, 
2008, p. 37), and also pointed out that the 
Navy certified its sonar technicians even 
when they had not practiced under surface 
ducting environments, given the infrequency 
of those conditions. 
Still, the Navy objected to the 
mitigation measures on the grounds that 
they would inhibit readiness.  In its brief, the 
government claimed the 2200-yard 
shutdown requirement ―would cripple the 
Navy‘s ability to conduct realistic pre-
deployment training and to assess a strike 
group‘s capabilities‖ (Brief for the 
Petitioners, 2008, p. 13).  The Navy also 
submitted numerous declarative statements 
in support of this argument.  Vice Admiral 
Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Third 
Fleet, stated that the 2200-yard shutdown 
zone would ―jeopardize the training and 
readiness‖ of strike groups.  Rear Admiral 
Bird argued that training in surface ducting 
conditions was ―critical to effective training.‖  
And Admiral Roughead and Rear Admiral 
Branch contended that both requirements 
would create an unacceptable risk and 
profoundly affect national security 
(Statements quoted in Fletcher, 2008, at 
50). 
 <Military readiness> functioned to 
highlight the importance of agency (MFA 
sonar) in fulfillment of the larger purpose of 
national security.  The discourse worked to 
draw attention to the need for training and 
proficiency in a complex technology to 
counter the technological advancements 
(diesel-electric submarines) of adversaries.  
When drawing upon the diachronic 
meanings of <readiness> generated by the 
Pearl Harbor narrative, one perceives the 
enemy as being capable and willing to use 
technological advances to exploit American 
vulnerabilities.  Regulations that limit the 
use of MFA sonar—such as the 2200-yard 
shutdown zone and the surface ducting 
requirements—became impediments to the 
successful mastery of agency in the service 
of the dominant ideograph.  Thus, 
responding to litigants who claimed that 
surface ducting conditions were rare, 
Roberts asserted in Winters that the 
―reasoning is backwards‖ and that, if 
anything, ―it is especially important for the 
Navy to be able to train under these 
conditions when they occur‖ (2008, at 41-
42).  Terminologies featuring agents 
(whales), scene (the environment) and act 
(the injunction) became subordinated to 
agency (sonar) and purpose (readiness). 
In The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on 
Argumentation, Chaim Perelman and Lucie 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca identify loci communes as 
those categories (―common places‖) of a 
general nature that advocates use to 
advance argumentative claims (1969, pp. 
83-85).  Environmental advocates have 
frequently invoked a locus of quality, 
particularly appeals to the irreparable, to 
argue on behalf of the uniqueness, 
precariousness, and timeliness of the 
natural environment (Cox 1982).  But 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note, ―each 
locus can be confronted by one that is 
contrary to it‖ (85).  The NRDC and its allies 
have used appeals to the irreparable to 
highlight the uniqueness of the species of 
marine mammals near the California 
coastline, the sensitivity of these animals to 
MFA sonar, and the urgent need to forestall 
the Navy‘s use of sonar in these waters.  
The Navy and its allies have responded with 
an ideograph of <military readiness> that 
shifts emphasis to a locus of quantity, 
imposing difficult threshold requirements on 
environmental litigants while valorizing 
deference to military authorities. 
To obtain a preliminary injunction, 
litigants must demonstrate a combination of 
probable success on the merits of its claim, 
the possibility of irreparable harm, and they 
must show that the balance of hardships 
tips in their favor.  The lower courts found 
that NRDC had satisfied these 
requirements.  However, in its brief, the 
government argued that a preliminary 
injunction was ―an extraordinary and drastic 
remedy,‖ and suggested the lower courts 
erred in holding that litigants need only 
show a ―mere possibility‖ of irreparable 
harm to justify granting an injunction, as 
opposed to the more stringent standard of a 
―likelihood‖ of irreparable injury.  In its ruling 
in Winter, the Supreme Court agreed the 
―possibility‖ standard was too lenient, and 
instead affirmed the need for plaintiffs to 
demonstrate irreparable injury was likely in 
the absence of an injunction. 
Aside from establishing a more 
challenging threshold of proof for 
environmental litigants, the shift from 
possibility to likelihood facilitated a rhetorical 
transition from a locus of quality to a locus 
of quantity, ―which affirm that one thing is 
better than another for quantitative reasons‖ 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
85).  This was apparent in the Navy‘s oft-
repeated claim that it had trained in SOCAL 
waters for 40 years without any evidence of 
marine mammal fatalities. In oral 
arguments, Solicitor General Garre 
stressed, ―the Navy has been using MFA 
sonar in the Southern California Operating 
Area for more than 40 years and no one can 
point to any harm to marine mammals‖ (Oral 
Arguments, 2008, p. 23).  The apparent 
persuasiveness of this claim was confirmed 
by the frequency by which it appears in 
Roberts‘s majority decision—five times. 
―The Navy emphasizes that it has used 
MFA sonar during training exercises in 
SOCAL for 40 years,‖ wrote Roberts in one 
of these examples, ―without a single 
documented sonar-related injury to any 
marine mammal.‖ (2008, at 14) 
This rhetorical maneuver is an 
example of the argumentum ad ignorantiam 
fallacy, or the ―appeal to ignorance,‖ which 
uses an opponent‘s inability to disprove a 
conclusion as proof of the conclusion‘s 
correctness (Engel, 1994, p. 227).  It 
challenges environmentalists to produce 
bodies as proof of irreparable harm; 
otherwise, no harm is presumed to exist.  
There are obvious problems to this 
reasoning.  Since the injuries occur to 
marine mammals while they are in the 
water, many whales ―are dying in 
substantially larger numbers‖ than scientists 
realize, given that most of the dead animals 
do not strand on shore where people can 
count them (Jasney, 2005, p. v).  Beaked 
whales, in particular, are sensitive to sonar 
but difficult to detect.  A 2007 study by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service revealed, 
―in 90% of beaked whale stocks a decline in 
population of 50% over a 15-year period 
would go undetected as a decline at all‖ 
(Fletcher, 2008, at 31).  Non-fatal injuries 
would be even harder to detect.  It is also 
unclear from the record whether the Navy 
has been using MFA sonar over the past 40 
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years at the same power level, frequency, 
and duration as it does in the current 
exercises.  In addition, in its ―after action 
reports,‖ the Navy documented a number of 
marine mammal deaths in SOCAL waters 
following exercises using MFA sonar, but 
the reports did not disclose whether 
necropsies were performed on the 
carcasses to determine the cause of the 
deaths or whether they were linked to sonar 
use (Fletcher, 2008, at 28-29). 
<Military readiness> accentuates the 
locus of quantity by celebrating the 
expertise of military officials.  Writing about 
a similar ideograph of <necessity>, Marouf 
Hasian Jr. argues, ―necessitous 
circumstances are treated as a priori facts 
that inform the decisions made by elites 
who have the special training in the 
handling of these affairs.  This is one of the 
reasons why we hear so much about civilian 
‗deference‘ during times of war‖ (2005, p. 
11).15  In the legal and public rhetoric of 
<military readiness>, especially measured 
quantitatively and constrained by a 
technological psychosis emphasizing 
agency, deference is granted to military 
experts to assess both threats and 
capabilities.  During oral arguments, for 
example, several justices questioned the 
ability of a district court judge to render an 
informed judgment on military strategy. 
―Isn‘t there something incredibly odd about 
a single district judge making a 
determination on that defense question that 
is contrary to the determination that the 
Navy has made?‖ asked Justice Alito in a 
question to NRDC attorney Kendall (Oral 
Arguments, 2008, p. 30).  When Kendall 
replied that the district judge made a factual 
determination in the case, Alito pressed a 
similar question later in the oral arguments: 
―Is Judge Cooper an expert on 
antisubmarine warfare?‖ he asked (Oral 
Arguments, 2008, p. 49).  Even Justice 
                                                     
15
 While similar, the ideographs of military <necessity> and 
<readiness> are distinct in many ways, since <readiness> 
places emphasis on future action to prevent perceived 
vulnerabilities, especially with respect to the marshaling of 
military technology to reduce strategic uncertainties. 
Breyer conceded during oral arguments, 
―Look, I don‘t know anything about this.  I‘m 
not a naval officer…[and]… I know that 
district judge doesn‘t know about it, either‖ 
(Oral Arguments, 2008, p. 35).  This 
deference to military authority was reflected 
in the majority opinion in Winters, as well.  
Wrote Roberts: ―We accept these officers‘ 
assertions that the use of MFA sonar under 
realistic conditions during training exercises 
is of the utmost importance to the Navy and 
the Nation‖ (2008, 34) 
Writing about the rhetoric of 
nukespeak, Edward Schiappa (1989) 
argues that military experts use strategies of 
domestication and bureaucratization to 
make the discourse about nuclear weapons 
paradoxically familiar and inaccessible to 
public audiences.  In a similar way, <military 
readiness> encourages simplification 
through a narrative of surprise and 
vigilance, combined with deference to 
authorities perceived to be capable of 
understanding strategic military doctrine.  
The fact that members of the district court 
visited a naval ship relegated their 
experiences to those of tourists and 
reinforced a presumed dependence on 
military experts to decipher and explain the 
complexities of military technology.  Alito‘s 
question about Judge Cooper‘s knowledge 
of ASW further diminished her stature as a 
credible authority, even though she carefully 
crafted mitigation measures based on her 
extensive knowledge of the facts in the 
case. <Military readiness> functioned to 
juxtapose a masculine ethos of military 
experience with a feminized, sentimental 
pathos for marine mammals. 
 
Conclusion 
In their attempts to dismiss evidence 
linking MFA sonar to the deaths and injuries 
of marine mammals, the Navy and its 
proponents have resorted to absurd 
arguments, such as the claim that marine 
mammals are not affected by sonar 
because they spend most of their time out 
of the water, or that whales ―just swim in a 
different direction‖ when they hear the noise 
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produced by sonar (Oral Arguments, 2008, 
pp. 8-9).  Perhaps realizing that the 
scientific case linking military sonar with 
cetacean mortalities and injuries has 
―progressed well beyond the point of finding 
a smoking gun‖ (Parsons et. al., 2008, p. 
1255), the Navy has relied increasingly on 
rhetorics emphasizing <military readiness> 
to show that ―national security can trump 
marine mammal protection‖ (Brief for the 
Petitioners, 2008, p. 35).  In this essay, I 
have demonstrated that this ideograph 
constitutes public audiences as victims 
vulnerable to surprise attack, whose best 
option relies on deference to military 
authorities to protect them with technology 
that should be used without constraints. 
There are several ―potential 
consequences of public adherence to a 
particular vocabulary of motives‖ (Cloud, 
1998, p. 389).  From a legal standpoint, 
Winter v. NRDC raises several troubling 
prospects.  First, military officials are certain 
to invoke <military readiness> with renewed 
vigor when confronted with situations that 
―encroach‖ on military training, and there 
are numerous instances where they believe 
this is the case (Dycus 1996; Burke 2008; 
Babcock 2007; Yap 2004).  Second, as 
mentioned earlier, environmental advocates 
will need to establish a ―likelihood‖ of 
irreparable harm in future cases to warrant 
an injunction against damaging practices.  
Thus, even though the military faced no 
threshold of proof when it asserted its 
harms in Winter (there was no discussion of 
the likelihood of an attack by diesel-electric 
submarines, and such harms were assumed 
plausible based only on the declarative 
statements of military authorities), 
advocates will be faced with a high 
threshold in future cases where they seek 
injunctive relief against environmental 
harms.  Third, the case has potentially 
significant implications for public 
participation in environmental decisions.  
When it enacted NEPA in 1969, Congress 
created a process that, for the first time, 
involved ―the public in environmental 
decision making in a comprehensive 
manner‖ (Cox, 2006, p. 93).  NEPA requires 
agencies to prepare an EIS when significant 
environmental impacts result from proposed 
actions.  But the Navy avoided the 
requirement for public comment by only 
completing an environmental assessment 
(EA) of its SOCAL exercises.16  An EIS 
wasn‘t scheduled for completion until the 
conclusion of those exercises.  While some 
suggested the scope of Winter is limited 
(Eubanks 2009), if a similar pattern is 
followed in future cases, the public will 
either be left out of deliberations or allowed 
to participate only after the environmental 
harms have occurred. 
Rhetorically, advocates working 
within the existing legal framework are 
constrained by <military readiness> and 
often do not challenge it directly.  Although 
he noted that ―the Navy cannot be the judge 
of its own cause‖ and that ―deference does 
have its limits,‖ NRDC attorney Kendall 
admitted that Naval training was ―of the 
highest importance‖ (Oral Arguments, 2008, 
p. 50).  Constrained by the coercive 
dimensions of ideographic adherence, 
advocates working in the court system 
might rely heavily on the precautionary 
principle, with preference given to the 
probable (harm to whales) over the 
improbable (reduced readiness as a result 
of mitigation measures).  However, while 
this balancing of risk was persuasive to the 
lower courts, the Supreme Court decision in 
Winter makes this option difficult.  This is 
perhaps the reason why NRDC settled 
recently a separate lawsuit against the Navy 
over sonar, agreeing to a proposal requiring 
the Navy to spend $14.75 million over three 
years on marine mammal research, but 
does not include any of the additional 
measures to protect animals when the 
                                                     
16
 An EIS has far more stringent requirements than an EA.  
An EIS must ―[r]igourously explore and objectively evaluate 
all reasonable alternatives‖ to the agency‘s action (Amici 
Curiae Brief for Defenders, 2008, pp. 36-37), which in this 
case would have meant examining and evaluating the 
effects of implementing mitigation measures.  In addition, the 
EIS allows for an ―early and open process‖ for public 
comment on the proposed action (Amici Curiae Brief for 
Defenders, 2008, p. 36). 
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military uses sonar (―Navy Settles,‖ 2008, p. 
A13). 
In countering a scientific, military, 
and technological orientation, Kenneth 
Burke (1984) urges critics to adopt a 
dialectical process that seeks 
counterstatements to prevailing 
perspectives.  In a similar move, Kevin 
Michael DeLuca (1999) draws upon the 
work of Laclau and Mouffe to suggest 
―antagonism chains‖ that might ―challenge 
and transform the hegemonic discourse of 
modern society (p. 45).  Such options might 
not be available in legal venues constrained 
by the decorum of precedent, but they 
would be available to advocates in the 
larger public sphere who might rearticulate 
<military readiness> in ways that challenged 
the presumed linkage between security, 
technology, and the domination of nature.  
Already, once dominant appeals to national 
security are encountering pressure points, 
as issues concerning detainees and 
warrantless wiretapping reveal the excesses 
of ideographic commitments. 
In a revealing moment during the 
oral arguments before the Supreme Court 
on October 8, 2008, Justice Breyer stated, 
―To a layperson, when I think of the armed 
forces preparing an environmental impact 
statement, I think, the whole point of the 
armed forces is to hurt the environment‖ 
(Oral Arguments, 2008, p. 44).  The 
transcript notes there was laughter in the 
courtroom, indicating perhaps that the 
comment was intended as a joke to make a 
larger point about procedural requirements 
under NEPA.  But if we might allow 
ourselves the pleasure to look back at this 
comment from the perspective of citizens 
liberated from <military readiness>, might 
we say that Justice Breyer was on to 
something? 
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